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I. Introduction 
Israel. The name alone produces strong reactions whatever one’s personal feelings on the subject might 
be. Despite being historically ancient, it is politically recent. In the short time since its independence it 
has faced many challenges, from wars, to economic downturns, mass immigration as well as many other 
difficult situations.  
Given the advanced nature of its academic accomplishments, it is hard to believe that the major 
challenges facing this country, according to an OECD report in 2008, are inequality and poverty. There 
are many wealthy people, but in contrast there are entire segments of the population that live far below 
the poverty line. Part of that stems from personal beliefs (the Bedouins, the Heradrim), but part of that 
inequality comes from discrimination towards other ethnicities, possibly even between some of the 
different “types” of Jews. 
The goal of this report is to present a quantifying measure of the discrimination in Israel using the 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition model. Not only do we intend on measuring the “scale” of discrimination 
but using data from 3 separate censuses we will try and analyze the trend of “discrimination” in Israel. 
This type of research is crucial in understanding the mechanism that rule the labor market in the hope of 
finding an appropriate policy or institutional response. 
We will provide an overview of some of the relevant literature on the subject, as well as our chosen 
theoretical model. We will detail the data used, some of the summary statistics and the results from the 
regression analysis to see if the real world data coincides with the research and the theory on the 
subject. 
 
II. Historical and Labor Market Context 
In the short time since Israels It has been involved in wars, economic crises, large political change, and 
all of these external forces have helped shape the mentality of the people and the labor market. It is 
what leads the Israelis to act the way they do, and according to the experts on the matter, discriminate 
against different ethnicities, Jewish or not.  This section is to show a brief overview of the events that 
can’t help but impact on the attitudes of workers and hirers. 
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Israel declared its independence on May 14th 1948 and on May 15th was attacked by neighboring Arab 
armies (Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan and Syria). Israel fought off the invaders, and on May 11th 1949 was 
accepted by majority vote as a member of the United Nations. Since then there have been many wars 
with its neighbors like: 1967, Six Day War; 1973, Yom Kippur War; 1982, Lebanese Invasion; 1986, 
Palestinian Uprising; 2006, War in Lebanon. In that time there have also been minor uprisings, terrorist 
attacks by Hezbollah, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and surgical military strikes against 
potential enemies, like the destruction of an Iraqi Nuclear generator in 1987. 
There is a clear pattern and it is that almost all of these events involve Arab nations or factions. Only 3 
members of the Arab league, Egypt, Jordan and Mauritania maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. 
Under Israeli law, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Sudan, and Yemen are considered enemy 
countries. Since the largest minority non-Jewish group in Israel are Arabs it would certainly help account 
for the discrimination in place. 
From an economic point of view, Israel relies heavily on the High-Technology sector, public defense, 
Academia and some agriculture for its revenue. It is one of the most advanced economies in the region, 
and was voted most efficient central bank in the world in 2010 for being resistant to economic crisis. 
That is a far cry from some of turmoil the country faced in its earlier years. In the early 1980’s the 
country went through a phase of hyperinflation that devalued its currency and endangered its economic 
health. 
As a result of conservative fiscal policy and the implementation of a new currency, the New Israeli 
Shekel on January 1st 1986, they were able to recover from the crisis. But it is possible some of the 
remedies enforced at that time have led to the more contemporary problems, such as limited social 
support, limited access to unemployment benefits, shortened periods of coverage among other cuts. 
Some of the sacrifices made then no doubt helped contribute to the widespread poverty now affecting 
the country. 
Politically, there have been many changes in leadership and policy over the years. Much of the early 
years of Israel was based on a “never again” mentality that reflected in a non-compromising, 
confrontational approach. Following the wars and the economic turmoil of the 1980’s and 1990’s a new 
political party proposing peace was elected to power. Partly due to the new immigrants, and the lack of 
progress from the previous administrations, this new Political party presents a change in public opinion, 
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and one would think that such a change would be reflected in the attitudes on the labor market. We will 
discuss this in the analysis section of this report. 
From a demographic point of view, Israel has seen some huge changes over the years, and this also has 
an impact on the actions and attitudes of Israelis. In 1948, at its independence there were 
approximately 800,000 citizens. In 1958 thanks mostly to immigration from North African countries that 
number rose to 2,000,000. Due to larger than average birth rates (compared to other OECD countries) 
and continued immigration the country reached 4,000,000 in the early 1980’s. After the fall of the Soviet 
Union and the opening of the borders of the Eastern bloc, many Jews from Russia immigrated and there 
was a mass migration to Israel in the early 1990’s that brought in around 1,000,000 more citizens. In 
2013 it is estimated to be over 8,000,000, nearly 10 times that at its independence a mere 65 years 
earlier. Immigration accounts for 40% of the Israeli population. 
The population is made up of roughly 75% Jews (North African Sefarades, Eastern European Ashkenazy, 
and Israelis), followed by 21% Arabs (83% Muslim, 8% Christian and 8% Druze), and finally the other 4% 
is made of other groups (non-Arab Christians, and various other religions). The poorest groups in the 
country are made up of the Bedouins, a Muslim nomadic tribes, and the Haredim, the ultra-orthodox 
Jews that believe in studying the Torah above all else. Both groups are characterized by low labor 
market participation as well as much higher than average birth rates. 
Prior to 1975 the labor market was mostly organized around collective bargaining mechanisms and was 
centered on union participation. Following the 1973 economic crash, the system has been more 
decentralized, and now relies more heavily on local government regulation by the REA (Regulation and 
Enforcement Agency). The largest issue facing the Labor market is the poor enforcement of labor laws, 
and as a result many of the disenfranchised groups like Muslims have poor outcomes and don’t even 
trust the REA to protect their rights. 
The REA has put in place several policies directly aimed at addressing the “Arab problem”: poor labor 
market participation, lower class of employment, and low level of REA complaints. Some of the main 
policies have been educational campaigns targeted at Arabs, in their language and using mediums 
specifically addressed to reach them. Contacting and Cooperating with Non Governmental Organisms 
(NGO’s) that help protect the rights of Arab workers. Also there is an effort not only to increase access 
to the REA but also improve hiring rates of Arabs in the REA (so that Arab workers will trust Arab REA 
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employees more). Another method is to increase control activities by the REA to demonstrate a change 
in policy, and not simply more adopting of rules that would not be enforced. One of the largest 
challenges facing the REA is the mistrust present in the Arab community that the Jewish workers will in 
fact have the Arabs best interest in mind. There is a long ways to go before decades of mistrust can give 
way to ethnic integration. 
 
III. Literature review 
Discrimination in Israel has been the subject of very many published articles, and it appears to be a facet 
that affects various levels of society over there. The difficulty is that the vast majority of the published 
articles belong to the social sciences field to expose discrimination in terms of education, housing, 
access to credit, to work and on wages, but comparatively little has been written in a quantitative 
manner on discrimination in Israel. 
There are a few articles that have been written on the subject, mostly using the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition. One such article is: Gender Versus Ethnic Wage Differentials Among Professionals: 
Evidence from Israel, Shoshana NEUMAN, Ronald L. OAXACA, which differentiates between different 
selectivity correction mechanism in the decomposition model. It shows that the results of such analyses 
rest greatly on the assumptions made in the choice of selectivity model. It finds values for the 
discrimination but is more a study of econometrical tools than a policy analysis. That article uses data 
only from the census year 1983 (possibly due to specific data availability), and focuses on job categories 
that are “professionals”. Our analysis uses significantly different data from that article. The exact 
specifications of the data will be discussed in the Data section later in this report. 
Another article that uses similar methodology is: Wage differentials between Ethnic groups in 
Switzerland, Augustine de Coulon. Switzerland in many ways is similar to Israel in that it is a very small 
country, made up of very distinct different and numerous ethnic groups. In that article they present the 
different rates at which the different groups are remunerated. Also Augustin de Coulon’s analysis 
demonstrates that “observable qualities” don’t adequately explain the difference in wages, and that the 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is an appropriate tool suited to that kind of analysis. 
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There are also many other articles published on discrimination between many of the different ethnic 
groups in Israel. Semyonov, Raijmanandt Yom-tov (2002), Peleg (2004), Okun and Friedlander (2005) all 
examined discrimination towards Arabs in Israeli society. While Fix, Streuk (1993), Altonji and Blank 
(1996), Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) present evidence that there is discrimination among the Jewish 
subgroups (Ashkenazy from Eastern Europe and Sefarade from North Africa). 
The multitude of articles published, as well as the findings of the OECD report on the Israeli labor market 
of 2008 would seem to indicate that this is a large widespread problem, and therefore should be fairly 
evident in the data. Showing the discrimination will not be challenge, it is more interesting to see if it 
not only fits the theories in place, and if we can draw any conclusions about the trends in the hopes of 
possibly being able to find the right tools to fix that particular problem. 
 
IV. Theoretical Econometric model 
This report rests on the theory from the 1973 article from Blinder and Oaxaca, which decomposes 
differences in wages in 2 categories. The theory states that differences between 2 different groups stem 
from 2 separate sources: differences in observable characteristics, and unobservable effects that can be 
due to “discrimination”. 
The general idea is captured in the equation below: 
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Where:  
(1) is the observable difference in wages (Normally 1 being the dominant group and 0 being the 
discriminated group to allow for a positive number) 
(2) This is the difference due to Characteristics term. In practice it is when we use the average 
values of the “discriminated” group with the coefficients of the dominant group to measure: if 
they had the same characteristics how much would the discriminated group earn. 
(3) This is the Discrimination term. This measures the differences in coefficients between the 
groups. If there were no discrimination we would expect the estimated coefficients to be the 
same. That is that since the 2 groups would be “substitutes” they should have the same return 
on education, experience and the other variables. 
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We can also see these terms and these differences clearly on the standard Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition graph as below. 
 
 Similarly to the equation this graph shows the decomposition, but in the graph we see the visually the 
division the difference more clearly. Y* is the point from the first equation where we calculate the 
estimated wage using the characteristics of the “discriminated” group with the coefficients of the 
dominant group. Therefore 
 YJ - Y*= difference due to characteristics 
Y* - YNJ = difference due to “discrimination”  
The graph above is used to demonstrate the idea behind the theoretic model. It isn’t based on results 
from the regression, as we will see later some of it is verified (Jews have higher return on their 
coefficients than Non-Jews do) but other aspects don’t quite follow that (the coefficients is usually 
higher for the Non-Jews). We will discuss the specifics of our results in the next section after examining 
the data. 
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V. Data specifications 
The data come from Ipums International, from the University of Minnesota. It provides worldwide data 
for educational purposes. The data extracted is from 3 different censuses from the Israeli Census Bureau 
form the years 1972, 1983 and 1995. The data was comprised of 1,500,000 observations over the 3 
years. The data needed to be adjusted to suit the needs of this study. We kept the men, aged 25-65, 
who work full time for at least 10 months out of the year. That is to prevent discrimination against 
women from biasing the results, and also to remove seasonality effects. Also only using full time data is 
to allow comparison without having to convert the wages to the hourly basis, and allows for a more 
homogenous evaluation. 
Also, due to security and privacy concerns the data was presented in categories, and as such there was a 
set upper boundary. The upper cap represented a large portion of the data and so had to be cropped.  In 
the end we are left with 113,000 total data points, 27,000 in 1972, 35,000 in 1983 and 50,000 in 1995.  
We had to generate variables to use in our Mincerien Regression. We created the education variables 
using the codified data, and then used that variable to generate the experience variable. Also using 
religion we created the key, nonjew variable (to separate the regressions), and also created some binary 
variables like marital status (marriage) to use in the regression. 
Israel went through some very serious economic changes during the 2 decades captured by these 
censuses. At the beginning of the 1980’s there was a hyperinflation crisis making the 1983 earnings the 
highest by far of any year. As a result of this crisis on January 1st 1986 a new currency, the New Israeli 
Shekel (NIS) was put into effect, where 1 NIS = 1,000 Shekels. That means the earnings data went 
through uncommon inflation and then a change of units. The solution to that situation was a 
normalization using the ratios compared to average and then brought back to a common base which 
was the 1995 NIS level.  
In the end the quality of the data was not optimal for precise detailed analysis, but it still allows for the 
theoretical model to be put in place, and the results that are obtained still have real explicative power to 
help detail the situation. Despite the data suffering from classification issues, as well as boundaries, 
doesn’t interfere with the visible nature of the discrimination in the Israeli labor market. One can only 
assume that with more precise data, the relationship would merely be more accurate. 
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VI. Econometric Specification 
This report uses a Mincerien regression as the main tool in the measurement of discrimination in the 
Israeli labor market. The equation is rather standard and we utilize specifications of the model that use 
data available in all the years of the census. Specifically the variables we have chosen (and kept) are: 
education, experience, marital status (married), and the number of children at home (nchild) as well as 
multiples of some of these variables to indicate changing marginal returns (in this case, as the theory 
states, decreasing marginal returns).  
Log(wage) = β + βi(education) + βj(experience) + βk(marriage) + βl(nchild) 
With education and experience going up to the 4th power, and number of children (nchild) going up to 
its squared value. These are the standard wage explanation model. 
There were other potential variables available to use in the hopes of finding more a more strongly 
predictive model, but due to data availability across all 3 years these are the variables that were kept, 
but if a more detailed analysis of specific years were attempted variables like: primary language, country 
of birth, specific work classes could be used, and in the preliminary regressions most of them carried 
predictive power to explain earnings (were statistically significant). 
VII. Regression Results 
As mentioned, the model was run using the data discussed in the previous section and the results across 
the different years for the different groups are presented in Appendix III. The cells highlighted in the 
table proved not to be significantly different than 0. That is we cannot say if they have explicative power 
or not. Some of that reflects the quality of the data, but also could be a consequence of the situation on 
the labor market. Also all the individual Stata regression results are available in the Appendix II of this 
report for closer analysis. 
Let us review some of the important points from the table in Appendix III (page 24). The table lists all the 
coefficients for separately run regression by year and by different group, Jewish and Non-Jewish, also 
the data summary for all the regression variables alongside the coefficients. It may be a lot of 
information to take it, but following 6 different regressions and different summaries is a lot of data to 
try and compare.  
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For starters, as stated in the demographic section, the Non-Jews make up around one quarter of the 
population, and while it is true that that proportion tends to be growing, it was not 10% in 1972. That 
means that since we have about 10% of the data for the minority group, more of them were disqualified 
in either our lower boundary truncating or else they were not working full time for at least 10 months of 
the last year. In fact we have about 10% non-Jews in 1972, 16% non-Jews in 1983 and 20% non-Jews in 
1995. That is a good sign since it appears to be increasing. That means that at least integration rates are 
increasing in the labor market, and even if discrimination persists, it is not so strong as to discourage 
entry on the labor market. 
Next we can look at the summary statistics for the different groups in the different years. Education 
seems to always be significantly higher for Jews than Non-Jews. Also, there was a dip in average 
education in 1983, which is likely due to the fact that in the middle of a recession and hyperinflation the 
opportunity cost of education is very much higher and so no doubt people opt to get work and earn a 
wage rather than continue with more education. That relationship was true for Jews and Non-Jews alike. 
Experience showed a different pattern. Often times in discrimination models you expect the 
discriminated group to have higher experience since education offers them less and so they work 
earlier. In this case at the start in 1972, Jews still had higher experience rates, but that pattern switched 
in 1983, indicating either immigration changed the average level of education or else that there were 
more young Jews on the labor market lowering the mean experience value. In 1995 the ratio returned to 
its original state. More likely it signifies that during the recession in the 1980’s older more experienced 
Non-Jews had to re-enter the job market to make ends meet, but after the crisis passed they removed 
themselves from the Labor market again. 
Finally the demographic variables, marital status and number of children verify what the other studies 
have attested to. In the beginning there were very close rates of marriage between groups, but the Jews 
marriage rate is decreasing across time, and the Non-Jews rate is remaining stable at around 90%. Also 
no-Jews have significantly more children and continue to do so across time, even though in both groups 
the number of children is decreasing with time. 
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In terms of the coefficients there are some interesting findings as well. Most of the coefficients follow 
the theory, and the signs (+ or -) follow what we would expect. However, some variables are not 
statistically significant which tends to be interesting. For instance in the regression for 1972, very few of 
the coefficients are significant for the non-Jews. In fact for that particular iteration, only marriage and 
the number of children have significant explanatory power.  It’s hard to say whether it is a data issue, or 
if it’s some kind of evidence of discrimination (qualitative in this case). What is most likely is that there is 
such a wide variety of data points for the Non-Jews, and it depends more on other factors (such as 
location, industry…) that the observed variables don’t adequately capture the dynamics of the labor 
market.  
However, that trend does not continue, and despite higher levels of experience not being significant, the 
rest of the variables are. Specifically if education is the main signal on the labor market and provides no 
return (not significant) then the Mincerien regression would not be an appropriate tool. The experience 
is kept in the regression to allow for comparison between groups and between different dates. 
As for the level of the coefficients it does seem to be verified. One interesting note is that the constant is 
higher for Non-Jews is higher than for Jews. Since the coefficients are generally lower for Non-Jews and 
they have less education and experience, it does make sense that the constant would be higher. That 
however is slightly different than the graph presented above. In fact it might follow more closely 
another wage discrimination model (statistical discrimination), but that is outside the scope of this 
analysis (it would also require data on the attitudes towards a discriminated group which are not 
available).  
The coefficient for education, which in this particular model reflects the return on education, presents 
some interesting traits. It appears in 1972 that education had a much higher impact on wage than in 
subsequent years (0.55 in 1972, 0.34 in 1983, and 0.38 for Jews, and 0.25 (Not significant) in 1972, 0.35 
in 1983 and 0.33 in 1995 for Non-Jews). As explained above it would likely be due to the economic crisis 
that not only changed how education was valued, but also meant a generation of students entered the 
labor force with less education and thus when they prospered they reduced the value of education. It is 
interesting to see that in 1983 the return on education was higher for Non-Jews than for Jews. But that 
is due to the fact that with much less education they still made less overall. And in 1995 we see the 
trend follow the expected pattern and Jews get a higher return on education. 
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Experience in this model doesn’t seem to follow the theoretical models. Ordinarily a discriminated group 
receives less return on education, and so educates themselves less (so far that has been observed in the 
model), but as a result they work more, tend to have higher experience in the labor market and get a 
higher return (usually with a higher negative value for experience squared to show the decreasing 
marginal returns). In this particular model, the experience is hardly relevant for the Non-Jew group, and 
only the real experience is significant in 1983, that is in the middle of a large economic crisis. Also since 
the mean values are less usually than for the Jewish group the theory isn’t really verified. That is hard to 
explain why. 
Finally we have the demographic variables, marital status and Number of children. In this model 
Marriage means not single, and the number of children (squared also) was included to try and capture 
the effect of poverty in the subgroups that have many children like the Bedouins and the Heradrim. It 
turns out again these patterns were not visible in the regressions. The main reason why, is that most 
likely, since those groups have very low labor market participation they were not included in the data 
that was kept from the original 1,500,000. Something worth noting is that there is a very large drop in 
the coefficient for marriage across time (gets to be 4 times smaller than in 1972 for Jews and Non-Jews 
alike), and once more that Non-Jews actually drop their coefficient first. In 1972 it appears that marriage 
increases the wage significantly, but by 1995 that coefficient is divided in 4 for both groups. Whether it 
is another effect being felt, or simply a result of demographic change (immigration…) is hard to pinpoint. 
Overall, given the quality of the data, and the necessary modifications that were brought to it, the 
results of the regressions and the data summaries fit very well with the predicted theory and the other 
publications on the subject. Now we will use that data to decompose it with the Blinder-Oaxaca method 
and see what we can gather. 
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VIII. Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
As the theoretical section of this report mentioned, the goal will be to separate the differences that are 
due to different characteristics, and the unexplained “discrimination factor”. Before getting into the 
specifics it is worth noting at this point the “Value” we find using the decomposition is rather hard to 
interpret on its own. In fact that is one of the flaws with this method is that the number in itself with no 
context doesn’t really inform that much. For us however we are not merely looking at one year and 
seeing the “B-O” result. Our goal rather is to allow a comparison between the different censuses to 
allow for a trend. Also the B-O number itself will be used to compare the scale of discrimination.  
The technique used is to compare the summary statistics of the discriminated against group and using 
the coefficients of the dominant group see how much is observable, and how much is unobservable. The 
data is presented in the table below: 
 
1972 1983 1995 
Predicted Jewish Value 8.59640 8.54200 8.57933 
Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 8.40677 8.26910 8.37899 
Predicted Non-Jewish Value 8.15840 7.96944 8.08008 
Observable Difference 0.18963 0.27290 0.20034 
Unexplained Difference 
(Discrimintaion) 0.24837 0.29966 0.29891 
Total Difference 0.43800 0.57255 0.49925 
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This is the ultimate goal of this analysis. We can see exactly the breakdown of how the differences are 
allocated, and specifically how much is explainable and how much is due to unobservable factors. Also 
this level of discrimination is within the normal amounts for similar type studies. 
The important information to remember from that table is that: Firstly, the discrimination term is always 
larger than the explained term. That means that wage discrimination is a more important factor in 
determining wages differences for a discriminated group than the observable characteristics. Secondly, 
when economic situation worsens we can see here that discrimination increases. However when the 
situations improves there is a rigidity to reducing discrimination. Also, it is interesting to note that at 
some point Discrimination becomes almost structural. Despite the fact that in the early 1990’s there was 
a mass migration of new Jewish people, who did not have that shared history with the Non-Jews, 
discrimination did not appear to decrease. Also similarly even though the Israeli people elected a 
political party that was based on making peace and accommodations, in practice in the labor market 
there is still a strong wage discrimination against the Non-Jew group. 
It is good to see that the methodology put in place by Blinder and Oaxaca produces results. In a country 
as divided as Israel, the relationship should be blatant, and it turns out that it is. The tool is perfectly 
suited to shed some light on the inner workings of the wage differences. And that in the end ends up 
being a potential valuable policy tool. 
 
IX. Conclusion 
The goal of the report was to examine the labor market in Israel and see if we could in fact bring to light 
some quantitative evidence of discrimination as defined by Blinder and Oaxaca in their 1973 publication. 
We gathered data for the country for 3 separate years, and then ran regressions with the data to see if 
we could observe the desired trends. In the end, despite somewhat limited data, we are not only able to 
see and measure discrimination, but also the data follows the theory relatively well. 
We were able to show that discrimination exists and that there is even a trend that when things go 
badly, discrimination increases. Also when things improve, it takes longer for discrimination to decrease. 
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This type of research is crucial to not only understand the dynamics of the labor market in these types of 
situations but also to allow the regulatory body to have means of measuring the effectiveness of 
potential policies aimed at reducing discrimination in the workplace. Of course the number of cases 
pursued is an indicator, but it doesn’t really capture the level of discrimination, also it cannot measure 
the number of cases that were not pursued due to discrimination. It doesn’t really help focus the 
attentions of the regulatory body in the direction where the most good can be done. 
In our analysis we showed that Discrimination plays a larger role than observed differenced in terms of 
explaining wage differences. That means that to have an impact, the institutions in place should put in 
place measure to reward desirable (good) behavior, such as incentives for affirmative action, as well as 
punish discriminatory behavior. This type of model can help point the tools in the direction where the 
most good will be done. 
Similarly, if we had found that the bulk of the difference resulted from difference in characteristics, then 
the governing body should rather put policies in place that increase access to education, or merely to try 
and allow the discriminated group to catch up and have the characteristics correspond with the 
dominant group to reduce the inequality. 
As we can see from our results, and as is usually the case, it would be a combination of factors that need 
to be used to remove discrimination from the labor market. This tool is crucially important because 
given that Governments have limited resources they can best target the areas that will yield the most 
positive returns. Discrimination between ethnicities in Israel is a hugely complex problem, and there is 
no silver bullet to cure it. This analysis allows not only to find areas to target but also to measure the 
effectiveness of any policies attempted. That is why this kind of research will hopefully one day rid the 
labor market of such problems. 
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Appendix I – Data Summary 
Table 1 – Data summary for Non-Jews in 1972 
 
 
Table 2 – Data summary for Jews in 1972 
 
 
Table 3 – Data summary for Non-Jews in 1983 
 
     nchild2        2561     21.5287    24.35963          0         81
      nchild        2561    3.686451    2.818135          0          9
                                                                      
     married        2561    .8969153    .3041289          0          1
        exp4        2561    219624.7    396346.3        625    3111696
        exp3        2561    8162.609    11335.05        125      74088
        exp2        2561      338.49    324.1763         25       1764
         exp        2561     16.4877    8.165281          5         42
                                                                      
       educ4        2561    26299.37    21797.37         81     104976
       educ3        2561    1963.641    1154.337         27       5832
       educ2        2561    151.1597    58.74911          9        324
        educ        2561    12.02421     2.56528          3         18
        logw        2561    8.158991    .5838595   5.687825    9.05825
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize logw educ educ2 educ3 educ4 exp exp2 exp3 exp4 married nchild nchild2 if year==1972 & nonjew==1
     nchild2       24798    7.174732    11.60738          0         81
      nchild       24798    2.063594    1.707756          0          9
                                                                      
     married       24798    .9022502    .2969821          0          1
        exp4       24798    305876.5    411239.6        625    3111696
        exp3       24798    10940.69    12252.08        125      74088
        exp2       24798    420.0143     359.819         25       1764
         exp       24798    18.27482    9.276245          5         42
                                                                      
       educ4       24798    43565.44    30726.59         81     104976
       educ3       24798     2893.87     1507.86         27       5832
       educ2       24798    197.4056    67.79849          9        324
        educ       24798    13.84051    2.417875          3         18
        logw       24798     8.59477     .510287   5.687825    9.05825
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize logw educ educ2 educ3 educ4 exp exp2 exp3 exp4 married nchild nchild2 if year==1972 & nonjew==0
     nchild2        5020    19.36873    22.56837          0         81
      nchild        5020    3.507769    2.658137          0          9
                                                                      
     married        5020    .9015936     .297893          0          1
        exp4        5020    384522.3    631597.9        625    3111696
        exp3        5020    12691.51    16264.76        125      74088
        exp2        5020    462.5821    413.0062         25       1764
         exp        5020    19.45657    9.167363          5         42
                                                                      
       educ4        5020    16679.41    28438.92         81     104976
       educ3        5020     1189.95    1597.617         27       5832
       educ2        5020    94.56155    87.97195          9        324
        educ        5020    8.787849    4.163979          3         18
        logw        5020    7.969165    .5800744    6.03988   9.379015
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize logw educ educ2 educ3 educ4 exp exp2 exp3 exp4 married nchild nchild2 if year==1983 & nonjew==1
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Table 4 – Data summary for Jews in 1983 
 
 
Table 5 – Data summary for Non-Jews in 1995 
 
 
Table 6 – Data summary for Jews in 1995 
 
 
     nchild2       31813    6.033257    8.003317          0         81
      nchild       31813    1.979065    1.454862          0          9
                                                                      
     married       31813    .8817779     .322876          0          1
        exp4       31813    368996.1    572399.4        625    3111696
        exp3       31813    12354.55    15340.84        125      74088
        exp2       31813    453.4644    404.1921         25       1764
         exp       31813    19.17062    9.271157          5         42
                                                                      
       educ4       31813    35216.71    37214.84         81     104976
       educ3       31813    2312.172    1952.255         27       5832
       educ2       31813    160.3838    97.43736          9        324
        educ       31813    11.99846    4.052322          3         18
        logw       31813    8.538814    .6422193    6.03988   9.379015
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize logw educ educ2 educ3 educ4 exp exp2 exp3 exp4 married nchild nchild2 if year==1983 & nonjew==0
     nchild2        8690    11.41979     14.7694          0         81
      nchild        8690     2.63015    2.121939          0          9
                                                                      
     married        8690    .8926352    .3095943          0          1
        exp4        8690    288413.4      499207        625    3111696
        exp3        8690    10177.95    13460.49        125      74088
        exp2        8690    399.4429    358.9897         25       1764
         exp        8690    18.15524    8.356935          5         42
                                                                      
       educ4        8690    25588.49    31274.26         81     104976
       educ3        8690    1787.534    1690.583         27       5832
       educ2        8690    133.3886    88.29984          9        324
        educ        8690    10.87031    3.902141          3         18
        logw        8634     8.07942    .5658377   6.977226   9.924168
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize logw educ educ2 educ3 educ4 exp exp2 exp3 exp4 married nchild nchild2 if year==1995 & nonjew==1
     nchild2       41387    5.242274    6.661761          0         81
      nchild       41387    1.815594    1.394969          0          9
                                                                      
     married       41387    .8473192    .3596839          0          1
        exp4       41387    340621.3    440763.5        625    3111696
        exp3       41387    12163.37    12571.27        125      74088
        exp2       41387    465.6474    351.8478         25       1764
         exp       41387    19.82287    8.526608          5         42
                                                                      
       educ4       41387    41017.28    35909.28         81     104976
       educ3       41387    2687.047    1820.537         27       5832
       educ2       41387    183.3331    86.06052          9        324
        educ       41387    13.13217    3.298424          3         18
        logw       41052    8.579808    .6614281   6.977226   9.924168
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize logw educ educ2 educ3 educ4 exp exp2 exp3 exp4 married nchild nchild2 if year==1995 & nonjew==0
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Appendix II – Regression Results 
Table 7 – Regression Results for Non-Jews in 1972 
 
 
 
Table 8 – Regression Results for Jews in 1972 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     7.257512   .5131751    14.14   0.000      6.25123    8.263795
     nchild2      -.00241   .0016375    -1.47   0.141    -.0056209    .0008009
      nchild     .0357691   .0151295     2.36   0.018     .0061016    .0654366
     married     .1862564   .0452516     4.12   0.000     .0975226    .2749901
        exp4     3.28e-06   1.65e-06     1.99   0.047     4.90e-08    6.51e-06
        exp3    -.0002627   .0001425    -1.84   0.065    -.0005422    .0000167
        exp2     .0064648    .004292     1.51   0.132    -.0019513    .0148809
         exp    -.0477294   .0525472    -0.91   0.364     -.150769    .0553102
       educ4    -.0001208   .0000551    -2.19   0.029    -.0002288   -.0000127
       educ3     .0047143   .0023841     1.98   0.048     .0000393    .0093892
       educ2    -.0568657   .0361124    -1.57   0.115    -.1276783    .0139468
        educ     .2654689   .2237034     1.19   0.235      -.17319    .7041277
                                                                              
        logw        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    872.683453  2560  .340891974           Root MSE      =  .55567
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0942
    Residual    787.059606  2549  .308771913           R-squared     =  0.0981
       Model    85.6238474    11  7.78398613           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 11,  2549) =    25.21
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     2561
. regress logw educ educ2 educ3 educ4 exp exp2 exp3 exp4 married nchild nchild2 if year==1972 & nonjew==1
                                                                              
       _cons     6.754669   .2514981    26.86   0.000     6.261717     7.24762
     nchild2    -.0088564   .0007056   -12.55   0.000    -.0102395   -.0074733
      nchild     .0472474    .005215     9.06   0.000     .0370257     .057469
     married     .2106393   .0120713    17.45   0.000     .1869789    .2342997
        exp4    -5.91e-07   5.27e-07    -1.12   0.262    -1.62e-06    4.42e-07
        exp3     .0000589   .0000431     1.37   0.172    -.0000256    .0001435
        exp2    -.0024805    .001224    -2.03   0.043    -.0048795   -.0000814
         exp     .0512689   .0138906     3.69   0.000     .0240426    .0784953
       educ4    -.0002181   .0000235    -9.30   0.000    -.0002641   -.0001722
       educ3     .0085967   .0010789     7.97   0.000      .006482    .0107113
       educ2    -.1102532   .0174637    -6.31   0.000    -.1444831   -.0760233
        educ     .5525441   .1151682     4.80   0.000     .3268075    .7782806
                                                                              
        logw        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    6456.96129 24797  .260392842           Root MSE      =  .47621
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1291
    Residual    5620.78173 24786  .226772441           R-squared     =  0.1295
       Model    836.179562    11  76.0163238           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 11, 24786) =   335.21
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    24798
. regress logw educ educ2 educ3 educ4 exp exp2 exp3 exp4 married nchild nchild2 if year==1972 & nonjew==0
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Table 9 – Regression Results for Non-Jews in 1983 
 
 
Table 10 – Regression Results for Jews in 1983 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     6.372682   .2504935    25.44   0.000     5.881605    6.863759
     nchild2    -.0042643   .0012119    -3.52   0.000    -.0066402   -.0018884
      nchild     .0339955   .0111752     3.04   0.002     .0120872    .0559038
     married     .0569363   .0320528     1.78   0.076    -.0059013    .1197738
        exp4    -1.36e-06   8.54e-07    -1.59   0.111    -3.04e-06    3.12e-07
        exp3     .0001421   .0000786     1.81   0.071    -.0000119    .0002961
        exp2    -.0057137   .0025037    -2.28   0.023     -.010622   -.0008054
         exp     .1075961   .0323744     3.32   0.001     .0441281    .1710641
       educ4    -.0001655   .0000332    -4.98   0.000    -.0002306   -.0001003
       educ3     .0061903   .0013386     4.62   0.000      .003566    .0088145
       educ2    -.0736766   .0183646    -4.01   0.000    -.1096792    -.037674
        educ     .3572128   .1012529     3.53   0.000     .1587129    .5557128
                                                                              
        logw        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1688.82463  5019  .336486279           Root MSE      =  .54536
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1161
    Residual    1489.45287  5008   .29741471           R-squared     =  0.1181
       Model    199.371767    11  18.1247061           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 11,  5008) =    60.94
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     5020
. regress logw educ educ2 educ3 educ4 exp exp2 exp3 exp4 married nchild nchild2 if year==1983 & nonjew==1
                                                                              
       _cons     6.043448   .1471657    41.07   0.000     5.754998    6.331899
     nchild2    -.0153296   .0010586   -14.48   0.000    -.0174045   -.0132548
      nchild     .0882634    .006518    13.54   0.000     .0754879    .1010388
     married      .198267   .0126263    15.70   0.000     .1735189     .223015
        exp4    -2.53e-06   4.14e-07    -6.12   0.000    -3.35e-06   -1.72e-06
        exp3     .0002698   .0000365     7.39   0.000     .0001983    .0003413
        exp2    -.0104349   .0011133    -9.37   0.000     -.012617   -.0082527
         exp     .1787158   .0137088    13.04   0.000      .151846    .2055856
       educ4    -.0001337   .0000143    -9.35   0.000    -.0001618   -.0001057
       educ3     .0050454   .0006184     8.16   0.000     .0038332    .0062575
       educ2     -.061735   .0094668    -6.52   0.000    -.0802903   -.0431796
        educ     .3410046    .061247     5.57   0.000      .220958    .4610511
                                                                              
        logw        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    13120.7203 31812  .412445627           Root MSE      =  .57422
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2005
    Residual     10485.829 31801  .329732683           R-squared     =  0.2008
       Model    2634.89125    11  239.535568           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 11, 31801) =   726.45
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    31813
. regress logw educ educ2 educ3 educ4 exp exp2 exp3 exp4 married nchild nchild2 if year==1983 & nonjew==0
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Table 11 – Regression Results for Non-Jews in 1995 
 
 
 
Table 12 – Regression Results for Jews in 1995 
                                                                              
       _cons      6.81277   .2324407    29.31   0.000     6.357131     7.26841
     nchild2    -.0065421   .0012013    -5.45   0.000    -.0088969   -.0041873
      nchild     .0477657   .0090411     5.28   0.000     .0300429    .0654886
     married     .0448649   .0226946     1.98   0.048     .0003781    .0893518
        exp4    -1.70e-08   8.02e-07    -0.02   0.983    -1.59e-06    1.56e-06
        exp3     8.63e-06   .0000714     0.12   0.904    -.0001313    .0001486
        exp2    -.0007898   .0022098    -0.36   0.721    -.0051216     .003542
         exp     .0296755   .0278369     1.07   0.286    -.0248914    .0842425
       educ4    -.0001114   .0000237    -4.69   0.000     -.000158   -.0000649
       educ3     .0044679   .0010027     4.46   0.000     .0025023    .0064335
       educ2    -.0591864   .0148613    -3.98   0.000    -.0883182   -.0300546
        educ     .3338402   .0921651     3.62   0.000     .1531746    .5145058
                                                                              
        logw        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    2764.04715  8633  .320172263           Root MSE      =  .54165
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0837
    Residual    2529.53688  8622  .293381684           R-squared     =  0.0848
       Model    234.510274    11  21.3191158           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 11,  8622) =    72.67
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     8634
. regress logw educ educ2 educ3 educ4 exp exp2 exp3 exp4 married nchild nchild2 if year==1995 & nonjew==1
                                                                              
       _cons     6.039205   .2294659    26.32   0.000     5.589447    6.488963
     nchild2    -.0246413   .0011767   -20.94   0.000    -.0269476   -.0223349
      nchild      .170381   .0064143    26.56   0.000     .1578089    .1829532
     married     .0452137   .0105709     4.28   0.000     .0244946    .0659329
        exp4    -3.13e-06   4.82e-07    -6.50   0.000    -4.08e-06   -2.19e-06
        exp3     .0003015    .000041     7.35   0.000     .0002211     .000382
        exp2    -.0102629   .0012162    -8.44   0.000    -.0126466   -.0078792
         exp     .1563533   .0146113    10.70   0.000     .1277149    .1849917
       educ4    -.0001325   .0000176    -7.53   0.000     -.000167    -.000098
       educ3     .0051585   .0008058     6.40   0.000     .0035791    .0067379
       educ2    -.0660491   .0132003    -5.00   0.000    -.0919219   -.0401762
        educ     .3870421   .0914623     4.23   0.000     .2077741    .5663102
                                                                              
        logw        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    17959.2856 41051  .437487165           Root MSE      =  .59623
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1874
    Residual    14589.1099 41040  .355485134           R-squared     =  0.1877
       Model     3370.1757    11  306.379609           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 11, 41040) =   861.86
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    41052
. regress logw educ educ2 educ3 educ4 exp exp2 exp3 exp4 married nchild nchild2 if year==1995 & nonjew==0
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Appendix III – Comparative Data Table 
Table 13 
 
1972 1983 1995 
 
Jews Non-Jews Jews Non-Jews Jews Non-Jews 
 
Coefficient Mean Coefficient Mean Coefficient Mean Coefficient Mean Coefficient Mean Coefficient Mean 
Constante 6.75467   7.25751   6.04345   6.37268   6.03921   6.81277   
educ 0.55254 13.841 0.26547 12.024 0.34100 11.998 0.35721 8.788 0.38704 13.132 0.33384 10.870 
educ2 -0.11025 197.41 -0.05687 151.16 -0.06174 160.384 -0.07368 94.562 -0.06605 183.333 -0.05919 133.39 
educ3 0.00860 2893.9 0.00471 1963.6 0.00505 2312.2 0.00619 1190.0 0.00516 2687.0 0.00447 1787.5 
educ4 -0.00022 43565 -0.00012 26299 -0.00013 35217 -0.00017 16679 -0.00013 41017 -0.00011 25588 
exp 0.05127 18.275 -0.04773 16.488 0.17872 19.171 0.10760 19.457 0.15635 19.823 0.02968 18.155 
exp2 -0.00248 420.01 0.00646 338.49 -0.01043 453.46 -0.00571 462.58 -0.01026 465.65 -0.00079 399.44 
exp3 0.00006 10941 -0.00026 8162.6 0.00027 12355 0.00014 12692 0.00030 12163 0.00001 10178 
exp4 0.00000 305877 0.00000 219625 0.00000 368996 0.00000 384522 0.00000 340621 0.00000 288413 
married 0.21064 0.9023 0.18626 0.8969 0.19827 0.8818 0.05694 0.9016 0.04521 0.8473 0.04486 0.8926 
nchild 0.04725 2.0636 0.03577 3.6865 0.08826 1.9791 0.03400 3.5078 0.17038 1.8156 0.04777 2.6302 
nchild2 -0.00886 7.1747 -0.00241 21.529 -0.01533 6.0333 -0.00426 19.369 -0.02464 5.2423 -0.00654 11.420 
N 24798   2561   31813   5020   41052   8634   
R2 0.12950   0.09810   0.20080   0.11810   0.18770   0.08480   
